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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF STATE OF UTAH 
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ARGUMENT 
From the time that Beckstead moved for summary judgment, he has consistently 
argued that he owed no duty of care to Hale that would give rise to a negligence claim 
based on premises liability. What has not been consistent is the reasoning offered by 
Beckstead to support his argument. To be clear, the only issue that Beckstead presented 
to the district court was a question of law regarding a landowner's duty of care to an 
independent contractor. 
Beckstead did not substantively argue to the district court that the open and 
obvious danger rule, in and of itself, was a reason why he did not owe a duty of care to 
Hale. Rather, Beckstead referenced in passing the doctrines pertaining to open and 
obvious dangers and assumption of the risk for the proposition that a landowner never 
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owed a duty of care to an independent contractor hired to work on a construction project 
because the premises wrere inherently dangerous. Moreover, Beckstead persists in his 
reliance on the "independent contractor" distinction, and overlooks the fact that he, as the 
landowner and general contractor, created and maintained the dangerous condition that 
caused Hale's injury.1 
Rather than fully developing an argument in the context of Utah premises liability 
law, Beckstead has thus far successfully shifted his argument from one regarding an issue 
of law at the district court level to one regarding an issue of fact at the Appeals Court 
level. Specifically, Beckstead's assertion that Hale failed to present to the district court 
evidence relating to the exceptions to the open and obvious danger rule as set forth in 
Sections 343 and 343A is misplaced. Aside from Beckstead's erroneous presumption that 
the open and obvious danger rule continues to act as an automatic bar to recovery unless 
proved otherwise, this issue was not squarely before the district court based on 
Beckstead's motion for summary judgment. Hale, as the non-moving party, could not 
anticipate that he would need to respond to, let alone present evidence on, issues not 
addressed by the moving party. Indeed, the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds by 
]Beckstead continues to avoid reconciling, or even addressing, Utah's Comparative 
Negligence Act with the Court of Appeals' decision in Hale v. Beckstead, 2003 UT App 240. 
Instead, Beckstead argues that "in certain circumstances, the open and obvious danger rule could 
completely absolve a defendant from liability." (Respondent's Brief On Certiorari at 10.) 
According to Beckstead, those "certain circumstances" include occasions when a landowner 
invites others to perform work on his property around a plainly visible danger. (Respondent's 
Brief On Certiorari at 11.) This reasoning eradicates any meaningful distinction between invitees 
and trespassers. An independent contractor, who is by definition a business invitee, could be 
deemed to have less protection than a trespasser with respect to dangerous conditions on a 
landowner's property. 
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undertaking an analysis of the ultimate factual issue which Hale has not yet had the 
opportunity to present to the finder of fact in the district court. 
Other inconsistencies in Beckstead's Brief on Certiorari relate to his evolving 
treatment of the facts as well as his use of English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). 
According to Beckstead's descriptions, Hale has undergone a metamorphosis from un-
licensed, un-bonded, and uninsured painter to a "professional" and "experienced" 
painter. Compare R 62 with Respondent's Brief on Cert, at 2, 11. Likewise, Beckstead 
cites to English v. Kienke to support diametrically opposed positions. In his brief to the 
Court of Appeals, Beckstead correctly conceded that English v. Kienke "stands for the 
proposition that a workman who comes onto land to make improvements, alterations, or 
repairs is owed a duty of care by the landowner which is equivalent to that owed to a 
regular invitee." Appellee's Brief at 12. Now Beckstead cites to English v. Kienke for the 
proposition that a "landowner [does] not owe a duty of care to an injured invitee." 
Respondent's Brief on Cert, at 6 (emphasis added). 
Because the ultimate holding in English v. Kienke is that a landlord is not liable for 
dangerous conditions created by his tenant, its applicability in this case is somewhat 
limited. However, this Court in English did define the circumstances under which a 
landowner does owe a duty of care to those he invites onto his property to perform work. 
First, this Court stated that a landowner who is in actual physical possession of the 
property and who invites others, including independent contractors, to perform work on 
his property, owes a duty of care to those invitees. English at 156. Second, this Court 
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made an explicit distinction between dangerous conditions that were created by the 
invitee and those that were created by the landowner, or at the landowner's behest. Id. at 
156 - 157. This court expressly distinguished its holding in English from situations where 
the danger was created by, or at the direction of, the landowner. Id. at 156 (distinguishing 
cases cited in the dissenting opinion on the basis that "in each of them, the owner retained 
either full or partial control over the work performed by the invitee.") 
This Court recognized that under these circumstances, Sections 343 and 343A of 
the Restatement impose a duty on the landowner with respect to dangers on the property. 
Id. Contrary to Beckstead's apparent position, this Court in English did not abandon the 
comparative negligence framework established in Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). While the court in Donahue v. Durfee abolished the all-or-nothing 
effect of the open and obvious danger rule, it also directed the fact finder's ability to 
consider the open and obvious nature of a dangerous condition as a factor in comparing 
the negligence of the landowner and that of the invitee. Sections 343 and 343 A of the 
Restatement embody the open and obvious danger rule, as well as the "safe workplace 
doctrine" referenced by this Court in English, which remain factors to be considered by 
the finder of fact in premises liability cases. The fact that this Court referred to Sections 
343 and 343 A of the Restatement in English did nothing to affect the vitality of Donahue 
in cases such as this where it has been established that the landowner owed a duty of care 
to the invitee. 
4 
Based upon the facts on the record, Beckstead was in actual physical possession of 
the property and had exclusive control over the creation and maintenance of the 
unprotected second-floor balcony. R 100 - 101. Hale was hired to paint the interior of 
Beckstead's home. R 101. Given these two facts and the analysis set forth in English v. 
Kienke, Beckstead clearly owed a duty of care towards Hale. Since Beckstead's sole 
argument to the district court was that he did not owe a duty of care to Hale, the Appeals 
Court should have simply reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and 
remanded the case back to the district court for trial. Hale would have then had the 
opportunity to present evidence pertaining to the nature of Beckstead's duty at the 
appropriate juncture in the litigation where the finder of fact could then balance the 
relative duties of the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Beckstead and the Court of Appeals have erroneously 
relied upon legal authority which has no application to the facts of this case and that the order 
granting Defendant summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this *P day of July, 2004. 
Aaron J. Prisbrey 
Elizabeth B. Grimshaw 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ Petitioner 
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